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‘...being a Noongar involves three ingredients: being 
born to a Noongar father or mother; living in Noongar 
country; and having learned Noongar ways.’1 
 
I INTRODUCTION 
 
The recent single judgement by Wilcox J in the Federal Court in Bennell v 
State of Western Australia (hereinafter referred to as Bennell) reveals an 
important shift in the trajectory of native title jurisprudence. The conclusion 
by Wilcox J, that the Noongar Aboriginal community held native title rights 
over the claimed area, was the product of a broader, more flexible approach to 
the test espoused by the High Court in Members of the Yorta Yorta Aboriginal 
Community v Victoria (hereinafter referred to as Yorta.)2 This case note 
briefly examines the implications of this important decision for future native 
title claims. 
 
II BACKGROUND TO THE CASE 
 
In Members of the Yorta Yorta Aboriginal Community v Victoria a majority of 
the High Court rejected the native title claim by the Yorta Yorta community, 
holding that the claimed area, a large tract of land and water in Northern 
Victoria and Southern New South Wales, did not satisfy the native title 
requirements. The trial judge, Olney J, held that on the facts, the Yorta Yorta 
people had lost their traditional connection with the land. In particular, Olney 
J concluded that the most significant evidence came from that of an English 
pastoralist, Edward Curr, who wrote in the 1840s. Olney J concluded that the  
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writings of Curr revealed evidence of traditional practices which 
hadsubsequently been abandoned. By abandoning their traditional lifestyle, 
Olney J concluded that the Yorta Yorta people had severed their traditional 
connection and therefore, could not satisfy the native title requirements as set 
out under s223(1) of the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth). A majority of the Full 
Court, Branson and Katz JJ, rejected the appeal, concluding that the finding of 
fact that Olney J had made was open to him and that he had not erred in law.3  
 
The High Court also rejected the appeal, concluding that on the facts, the 
Yorta Yorta community had not proven that their laws and customs were 
connected to a pre-sovereignty normative society and therefore had not 
satisfied the statutory concept of ‘traditional’. The majority concluded that the 
statutory definition of native title, in particular the use of the words 
‘traditional laws acknowledged, and the traditional customs observed’ meant 
that native title could only be established where the rights and interests of 
indigenous claimants were connected with the claimed land and sourced in a 
pre-sovereignty, normative indigenous system. Where that normative system 
has continued to the present day, without interruption or cessation, the laws 
and customs of the society will satisfy the statutory requirements. If the 
society has been dispersed, dislocated or interrupted as a consequence of 
European settlement, the laws and customs will not satisfy the statutory 
requirements because they will ‘cease to have continued existence and 
vitality’.4 
 
This decision was described as having the effect of preserving indigenous 
laws and customs in a ‘kind of colonial formaldehyde since 1788’, subjecting 
Australia’s indigenous people to a ‘neo-colonialist tradition’ and ignoring the 
continuing evolution and complexity of indigenous traditions.5 It formed the 
legal backdrop for the Bennell decision. 
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III THE BENNELL DECISION 
 
The judgement of Wilcox J in Bennell v State of Western Australia was 
handed down on 19 September 2006. After assessing voluminous evidence 
from thirty aboriginal witnesses, and five expert witnesses - including two 
historians, two anthropologists and a linguistic expert - his Honour concluded 
that the Noongar Aboriginal community had satisfied the statutory test for 
proving native title. The decision was a controversial one, described as 
‘sparking fresh hope’ for native title jurisprudence.6 The claimed area covered 
approximately 193,000 square kilometres and included the whole of the Perth 
metropolitan area and large regional centres such as Bunbury, Busselton, 
Margaret River, Alban, York, Toodyay, Katanning, Merredin and many other 
towns. 
 
In considering the evidence, Wilcox J concluded that there were two primary 
issues to determine. First, the identity of the community whose laws and 
customs governed the use and occupation of the land within the claim area in 
1829 and second, whether this community continues to exist, acknowledge 
and observe those laws and customs, albeit perhaps in an attenuated or 
somewhat changed form.7   
 
With respect to the first test, Wilcox J concluded that on the facts it was clear, 
despite the dislocation of community members, that there was a single 
Aboriginal community throughout the whole of the south-west of Western 
Australia known as the Noongar community.  
 
This conclusion was based upon a broad ranging assessment of different 
indigenous and non-indigenous evidence and included a ‘wealth’ of materials 
left by early European writers as well as expert evidence and indigenous 
statements.  Of particular cogency for Wilcox J was the evidence given by Dr 
Nicholas Thieberger, an expert in Aboriginal languages, setting out that in 
1829 a single language was used throughout the entire claimed area with 
minor dialectic differences. This evidence, combined with clear proof of 
unified customary practices within the claimed area and interaction between 
people living within the claimed area provided a positive indication of social 
unity. His Honour concluded that ‘[t]he current normative system is that of 
the Noongar society that existed in 1829, and which continues to be a body  
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united, amongst other ways, by its acknowledgement and observance of some 
of its traditional laws and customs.’8 
 
With respect to the second test, Wilcox J concluded that the Noongar 
community had not been abandoned and did continue to exist to the present 
day. Thus, it satisfied the statutory requirement, highlighted in Yorta, that the 
claimants show a connection to a pre-sovereignty normative system.  
 
Significantly, Wilcox J held that whilst the traditional laws and customs 
practised by the pre-sovereignty Noongar community normative system had 
changed dramatically over time, those changes did not rupture the traditional 
connection.  Rather, they constituted a ‘recognisable adaptation’ to the 
vicissitudes of European settlement. For example, Wilcox J concluded that the 
boodjas (home areas) that characterised the pre-sovereignty Noongar 
community had effectively disappeared and that whilst this change was 
significant, it was ‘readily understandable’. It was ‘forced upon the Aboriginal 
people by white settlement. As white settlers took over, and fenced, the land, 
Aborigines were forced off their home areas; the ‘bands’ or ‘tribes’, 
comprising several related families, were broken up…..The ability to maintain 
the ‘home area’ element of the pre-settlement normative system was lost.’9 
 
IV CONTINUITY OF SOCIETY VS UNCHANGED LAWS AND CUSTOMS 
 
The real point of departure for the Bennell decision lay in its conclusions 
concerning the impact of ‘changed’ laws and customs. Wilcox J made it clear 
that he was not going to adopt a ‘frozen in time’ attitude to the laws and 
customs of the Noongar community. He acknowledged several times that 
continuity of the pre-settlement society depended upon their ability to change 
and adapt to the different conditions imposed upon them. A number of related 
issues flowed from these conclusions.  
 
First, it clear that Wilcox J was prepared to endorse necessary, adaptive 
changes to traditional laws and customs necessary for post-settlement, 
community survival. He expressly stated that for ‘the normative system to 
have survived, it was obviously necessary to allow a degree of choice of 
country exceeding what would have been necessary in more ordered, pre-
settlement times.’10 Indigenous communities had to modify their traditional 
laws and customs to accommodate and survive the impact of European  
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settlement and these changes should not strip indigenous communities of their 
traditional connection. The focus, according to Wilcox J, should not be upon 
unchanged laws and customs but rather, ‘evidence of the continuity of the 
society.’11  Wilcox J quotes from the Yorta decision to support this 
conclusion. Specifically, his Honour revisited the comments of the majority in 
Yorta:  
 
[I]t is necessary to demonstrate that [despite the changes] the normative 
system out of which the claimed rights and interests arise is the normative 
system of the society [at sovereignty]…not a normative system rooted in 
some other, different, society…it must be shown that the society…has 
continued to exist throughout that period as a body united by its 
acknowledgement and observance of the laws and customs.12 
 
Wilcox J interpreted these comments as proof of the fact that continuity with a 
pre-sovereignty normative community will only be affected by fundamental 
social change, not merely legal or customary adaptations. This is an 
interesting conclusion because the comments themselves emanate from a 
larger section of the majority judgement in Yorta in which it is stated that 
traditional laws and customs need to continue substantially uninterrupted. The 
majority in Yorta allude to the fact that changes wrought by European 
settlement may make it ‘very difficult’ to establish a traditional connection. 
However, the majority were only prepared to qualify the continuity 
requirement by endorsing laws and customs which had continued 
‘substantially uninterrupted’. By contrast, Wilcox J in Bennell was prepared to 
accept complete interruption provided the interruption was a consequence of 
imposed change, producing necessary and recognisable adaptation. 
 
This pragmatic conclusion takes a fairer, more balanced approach to native 
title examination than the ‘tide of history’ approach endorsed by Yorta. It 
acknowledges the inevitability of social, legal and cultural adjustment 
following European settlement.13 Further, it raises the possibility of future 
cases examining social change in terms of whether it was forced or natural 
rather than simply examining it in terms of degree. Wilcox J specifically  
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states that in determining whether a change indicates a lack of social 
continuity, an examination of all of the relevant circumstances should be 
undertaken including ‘the importance of the relevant laws and customs and 
whether the changes seem to be the outcome of factors forced upon the 
community from outside its ranks.’14 Where the element of ‘force’ or ‘control’ 
underlies the change, the necessary adaptation should not be treated as a 
cessation of traditional connection, even if it has interrupted continuity with 
laws and customs exercised by pre-sovereignty normative communities, 
because the change itself was mandated by external circumstances. This shift 
in focus would enable native title requirements to be satisfied notwithstanding 
the fact that the community has experienced dramatic social and cultural 
upheaval, 
 
V CONCLUSION  
 
The decision of Wilcox J in Bennell represents an important shift in the 
development of native title jurisprudence. The flexibility and breadth of focus 
that Wilcox J displayed, both in his assessment of the facts and his 
interpretation of the law, imbues the decision with a sense of colonial 
perspective. His ultimate acceptance, as set out in his preceding statement, of 
the ‘devastating effect on the Noongars of the dispossession from their land 
and other social changes’ and his preparedness to endorse the validity of 
social continuity in the face of such change may, subject to impending 
appeals, mark the onset of a ‘post-colonial’ mindset.15 
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For a discussion on ‘post-colonial’ identity see: G Christie, ‘A Colonial Reading of 
Recent Jurisprudence: Sparrow, Dalgamuukw and Haida Nation’ (2005) Windsor 
YearBook Acess Just 17 esp 32-35. 
